We consider the min-cost multicast problem with multiple correlated sources, where each receiver wants to reconstruct all the sources. We initiate the study of the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of the terminals in this scenario of multicast of multiple sources by modeling it as a noncooperative game among the terminals. The degradation in performance due to the lack of regulation is measured by the Price of Anarchy(POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the socially optimum cost. Our main result is that the presence of source correlations can significantly increase the price of anarchy under some reasonable cost-splitting mechanisms as against the case of multicast with independent sources, where for a large class of cost functions, cost-splitting mechanisms can be designed that ensure that the price of anarchy is one. While establishing this result, we derive several interesting properties of the flows and rates at Nash equilibrium and the socially optimum solution and note the striking similarities between them. Further, we show that the Nash equilibrium is indeed a socially optimal solution albeit with a different set of (related) cost functions. This characterization of the Nash equilibrium also allows us to obtain a near tight upper bound on POA. The main techniques in our analysis are Lagrangian duality theory and the usage of the supermodularity of conditional entropy. Finally, all the results in this paper naturally extend to a large class of network information flow problems where the Slepian-Wolf polytope is replaced by any polymatroid, leading to a nice class of succinct multi-player games. We believe that the ideas in this paper allow the investigation of other practical and meaningful scenarios beyond network coding as well.
Introduction Motivation
Consider the following scenario: multiple cameras recording a football game from different angles that transmit their information over the Internet so that spectators can perform 3-D reconstruction on the images, and view the game from their favorite angles. With ever increasing bandwidths and faster processors, such scenarios may be realistic in a few years from now. There are some unique issues in such network information flow problems that set them apart from more traditional problems. Clearly since the data collected from the different cameras (or sources) would be correlated, one expects it to be more bandwidth efficient if each camera did not send its entire feed. It is of course desirable that the compression (or source coding) be performed in a distributed manner, on the fly. Moreover, we do expect that if the end users have to pay for such a service, they would be selfish, i.e. they would be willing to pay as little as possible for the network and camera resources while still being able to reconstruct the original sources. The costs to the end user include, the cost incurred due to using the links of the network and the cost incurred due to the requirement that the sources need to operate at a certain rate e.g. intuitively if a given camera is asked to provide a feed at 10 Mbps by one user vs. 100 Mbps by another user, the requirement will need to be 100 Mbps which would translate into a higher end, expensive camera.
Our Results
In this paper we abstract the above problem as a multicast network flow with correlated discrete memoryless sources and selfish terminals (i.e. receivers), and initiate the study of the inefficiency brought forth by the self-interested behavior of the terminals. We model the scenario as a noncooperative game among the selfinterested terminals who are requesting the various rates and flows to be able to reconstruct all the sources while trying to minimize their individual costs without any regard to the social welfare. The measure of performance degradation due to such loss in regulation that we adopt is the Price of Anarchy(POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the socially optimum cost [9, 11, 14, 13] . The problem of computing the socially optimum cost can be formulated as a convex program (assuming that the network can perform network coding). Naturally, the main technique in our analysis is Lagrangian duality theory [4] . The supermodularity of conditional entropy is exploited extensively as well.
Our main result is that the presence of source correlations can significantly increase the price of anarchy under some reasonable cost-splitting mechanisms. This is in stark contrast to the case of multicast with independent sources, where for a large class of cost functions, cost-splitting mechanisms can be designed that ensure that the price of anarchy is one. Towards establishing this result, we derive several interesting properties of the flows and rates at Nash equilibrium and the socially optimum solution and note the striking similarities between them. Finally, we show that the Nash equilibrium is indeed a socially optimal solution albeit with a different set of (related) cost functions. This characterization allows us to quantify the degradation caused by the lack of regulation. We construct explicit examples where POA is greater than one and also obtain an upper bound on POA which is near tight. Further, all the above results naturally extend to a large class of network information flow problems where the Slepian-Wolf polytope (that characterizes the feasible rate region) is replaced by any polymatroid. Finally, in the course of proving our main results we obtain several side results which might be of independent interest.
Related Work
Distributed source coding (or distributed compression) (see [5] , Ch. 14 for an overview) considers the problem of compressing multiple discrete memoryless sources that are observing correlated random variables. The landmark result of Slepian and Wolf [15] characterizes the feasible rate region for the recovery of the sources. However, the problem of Slepian and Wolf considers a direct link between the sources and the terminal. More generally one would expect that the sources communicate with the terminal over a network. Different aspects of the Slepian-Wolf problem over networks have been considered in ( [2, 6, 12] ). Network coding (first introduced in the seminal work of Ahlswede et al. [1] ) for correlated sources was considered by Ho et al. [8] . They considered a network with a set of sources and a set of terminals and showed that as long as the minimum cuts between all non-empty subsets of sources and a particular terminal were sufficiently large (essentially as long as the Slepian-Wolf region of the sources has an intersection with the capacity region of a given terminal), random linear network coding over the network followed by appropriate decoding at the terminals achieves the Slepian-Wolf bounds.
The work that is closest to our analysis is by Bhadra et al. [3] that considers the problem of minimum cost multicast with network coding in the case of single source and many selfish terminals. In this scenario, for a large class of edge cost functions, they develop a pricing mechanism for allocating the edge costs among the different terminals and show that it leads to a globally optimal solution to the original optimization problem, i.e. the price of anarchy is one. Their POA analysis is similar to that in the case of selfish routing [14, 13] . Our model is much more general and our results do not generalize from theirs in a straightforward manner. In particular, we need to judiciously exploit several non-trivial properties of the Slepian-Wolf polytope in our analysis.
Further, motivated by the need to deal with selfish users, particularly in network setting, there has been a large body of recent work at the intersection of game theory, economics, and theoretical computer science [10] . We believe that our paper adds another interesting dimension to this budding interdisciplinary endeavor.
The Model
Consider a directed graph G = (V, E). There is a set of source nodes S ⊂ V that are correlated and a set of sinks T ⊂ V that are the terminals (i.e. receivers). Each source node observes a discrete memoryless source X i . The Slepian-Wolf region of the sources is assumed to be known and is denoted R SW . For notational simplicity, let N S = |S|, N T = |T |, S = {1, 2, . . . , N S }, and T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t N T }. The set of paths from source s to terminal t is denoted by P s,t . Further, define P t = ∪ s∈S P s,t i.e. the set of all possible paths going to terminal t, and P = ∪ t∈T P t , the set of all possible paths. A flow is a function f : P −→ R + , i.e. the flow along a path P ∈ P is f P , and is a non-negative real number. A rate is a function R : S × T −→ R + , i.e the rate requested by the terminal t from the source s is R s,t . We will refer to a flow and rate pair (f, R) as flow-rate. Also, let us denote the rate vector for terminal t by R t and the vector of requested rates at source s by ρ s i.e. R t = (R 1,t , R 2,t , . . . , R N S ,t ) and ρ s = (R s,t 1 , R s,t 2 , . . . , R s,t N T ).
Associated with each edge e ∈ E is a cost c e , which takes as argument a scalar variable z e dependent on the flows to various terminals passing through e. Similarly, let d s be the cost function corresponding to the source s, which takes as argument a scalar variable y s dependent on the rates that various terminals request from s. These functions c e 's and d s 's are assumed to be strictly convex, positive, differentiable and monotonically increasing. Further, the functions
x dx are also strictly convex, positive, differentiable and monotonically increasing. We are interested in the scenario where each terminal wants to reconstruct all the sources. Thus, we have a joint rate and flow allocation problem. Let us call the quadruple
The problem of minimizing the total cost for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) can be then formulated as 1
subject to z e = z e (x e,t 1 , x e,t 2 , . . . , x e,t N T ) ∀e ∈ E x e,t = P ∈Pt:e∈P
Since network coding allows the sharing of edges, the penalty at an edge is only the maximum and not the sum i.e. z e is the maximum flow (among the different terminals) across the edge e. Similarly, the penalty at the sources for higher resolution quantization is also driven by the maximum level requested by each terminal i.e. y s is also maximum. Nevertheless, most of our analysis is done where z e and y s are any functions partially differentiable with respect to their arguments. Also, for differentiability requirements the maximum function is approximated as L p norm with p → ∞. The constraint (1) above models the fact that the total flow from the source s to a terminal t needs to be at least R s,t . Finally, the rate point of each terminal R t needs to be within the Slepian-Wolf polytope. A flow-rate (f, R) satisfying all the conditions in the above optimization problem (i.e. (NIF-CP) ) will be called a feasible flow-rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) and the cost C(f, R) will be referred to as social cost corresponding to this flow-rate. Also, we will call a solution (f * , R * ) of the above problem as an OPT flow-rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ).
The above formulation for minimization of the social cost disregards the fact that the agents who pay for the costs incurred at the edges and the sources may not be cooperative and may have incentives for strategic manipulation. In our scenario, essentially the terminals are the users who are required to pay for the network resources they are being provided, and they will usually be noncooperative and will behave selfishly trying to minimize their own respective costs without regard to the social cost. Of course, each terminal wants to be able to reconstruct all the sources. Therefore, we wish to consider flow-rates that represent an equilibrium among selfish terminals while they act strategically to minimize their own costs. To this end, we need market models, i.e. the mechanisms for splitting the costs among various terminals, and then to analyze the effect of selfish behavior on the social cost. Edge Costs: At a flow f , the cost of an edge e ∈ E (i.e. the total cost of flows on e) is c e (z e ). It is split among the terminals/players t ∈ T , each paying a fraction of this cost. Let us say that the fraction paid by the player t is Ψ e,t (x e ) i.e. the player t pays c e (z e )Ψ e,t (x e ) for the edge e. Here, x e denotes the vector (x e,t 1 , x e,t 2 , . . . , x e,t N T ). Of course, t∈T Ψ e,t (x e ) = 1 to ensure that total cost is borne by someone or the other. Therefore, the total cost borne by t across all the edges is e∈E c e (z e )Ψ e,t (x e ). By defining the marginal cost of a path P ∈ P t as C P (f ) := e∈P ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe) xe,t , this total cost can be equivalently written as P ∈Pt C P (f )f P . Source Costs: At a rate R, the cost for the source s is d s (y s ), which is split among the terminals/players t ∈ T , wherein t pays a fraction Φ s,t (ρ s ) i.e. the player t pays d s (y s )Φ s,t (ρ s ) for the source s. Of course, t∈T Φ s,t (ρ s ) = 1. Therefore, the total cost borne by t for all sources, denoted C (t)
Thus, with the edge cost splitting mechanism Ψ and the source cost splitting mechanism Φ, the total cost incurred by the player t ∈ T at flow-rate (f, R) denoted C (t) (f, R) is
With the above description, we can model the strategic interaction among terminals, while they rationally minimize their own costs, as a static one shot game of complete information. Consequently, we adopt the most natural solution concept for such games i.e. the Nash equilibrium which is defined in the following for our scenario. Note that the strategies for the players in this game are feasible flow-rates. For notational simplicity, let f −t be the vector of flows on paths not going to terminal t, and f t be the vector of flows on paths going to t, therefore f = (f −t , f t ). Similarly, R −t is the vector of rates corresponding to all players other than t, therefore R = (R −t , R t ).
Characterizing the Flows and Rates at Nash Equilibrium
In this section we study the properties of a Nash flow-rate i.e. a flow-rate that forms an equilibrium among the selfish terminals. With all the relevant cost functions given to be convex, for all the optimization problems, the general optimization problem as well as the optimization problems of individual terminals, a locally optimal solution will be the globally optimal one. Therefore, we expect to be able to obtain all the nice properties of a Nash flow-rate, which in general is robust against large deviations by the players, simply by considering the local/small deviations. Using this approach, we first establish the following lemma (proof is moved to appendix).
Lemma 2 Let (f, R) be a Nash flow-rate for
(2) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, we have P ∈Ps,t f P = R s,t (3) ∀t ∈ T , we have s∈S R s,t = H(X S ).
The property (1) states that at the equilibrium, the marginal cost of all paths, with positive flows, going from the same source to the same terminal, is the same and is no more than that of a path where no flow is steered. This confirms our intuition that at equilibrium it should not be possible for a terminal to move a tiny flow from one path to another of the same kind to reduce her cost. The properties (2) and (3) intuitively follow from the fact that since the cost functions are monotonically increasing a terminal would like to keep the flows and rates at their minimum allowed by the feasibility constraints. However, as evident from the proof of (3) one has to be careful with the inequalities corresponding to SW polytope while controlling the rates. Now, the lemma 2 (1), characterizes the relationship between the marginal cost of the various paths from same source to the same terminal, at the equilibrium. However, in our setting of joint allocation of rates and flows, the terminals have the choice of moving flows and rates from a path of one kind to another i.e. from a path starting at one source to another path starting at a different source. Therefore, we can expect a similar relationship as in the lemma 2 (1) in terms of the marginal cost of a path-source/flow-rate pair, when interpreted appropriately. The following lemma, that is proved in the appendix establishes such a result in the case of two correlated sources (i.e. when N S = 2).
Lemma 3
Let (f, R) be a Nash flow-rate for (G, c, d, R SW ). Let the number of sources N S = 2 and consider P i ∈ P i,t , P j ∈ P j,t , i = j such that
A generalization to multiple sources seems possible but becomes quite unwieldy and therefore we refrain from doing so. The crucial point to keep track of is to move the rates and flows together from the Nash flow-rate so that the new flow-rate is still feasible. This becomes messy as the number of rate inequalities corresponding to SW region increases. Moreover, as we shall see later in the paper such a general characterization is in fact not necessary to characterize the relationship between OPT and Nash flow-rates. Nevertheless, the above lemma provides some intuition on how to proceed towards that goal.
Characterizing the Optimal Flows and Rates
We now investigate the properties of an OPT flow-rate via Lagrangian duality theory [4] . Since the optimization problem (NIF-CP) is convex and the constraints are such that the strong duality holds, the KarushKuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions exactly characterize optimality [4] . Therefore, we start out by writing the Lagrangian dual of
where µ P ≥ 0, λ s,t ≥ 0 and ν A,t ≥ 0 are the dual variables (i.e. Lagrange multipliers). For notational simplicity, let us denote the partial derivative of z e with respect to x e,t , ∂ze ∂xe,t by z ′ e,t . Note that the partial derivative of x e,t w.r.t. to f P is 1 for a P ∈ P t . Similarly, we denote the partial derivative of y s with respect to R s,t , ∂ys ∂Rs,t by y ′ s,t . The KKT conditions are then given by the following equations along with the feasibility of the flow-rate (f, R) and the complementary slackness conditions µ P f P = 0 for all P ∈ P, λ s,t (R s,t − P ∈Ps,t f P ) = 0 for all s ∈ S, t ∈ T , and ν A,t H(X A |X A c ) − i∈A R i,t = 0 for all A ⊆ S, t ∈ T :
Let us now interpret the KKT conditions at the OPT flow-rate (f * , R * ). Suppose that f * P > 0 for P ∈ P s,t . Then due to complementary slackness, we have µ * P = 0 and consequently from equation (2) we get
. Now if we interpret the quantity e∈P c ′ e (z e )z ′ e,t (x e ) as the marginal cost of the path P associated with the flow-rate (f, R) then this condition implies that the marginal cost of all the paths going from the same source to the same terminal with positive flows at OPT is essentially the same. It is quite intuitive for if it were not true the objective function could be further decreased by moving some flow from a higher marginal cost path to a lower marginal cost one without violating feasibility conditions, and of course this should not be possible at the optimum. Similarly, the marginal cost along a path with zero flow at OPT must have higher marginal cost and indeed this can be obtained as above by further noting that the dual variables µ P 's are non-negative. We note this property of the OPT flow-rate in the following lemma.
Lemma 4
Let (f * , R * ) be an OPT flow-rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ). Then, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, P, Q ∈ P s,t with f P > 0 we have
Moreover, if f Q > 0 then the above result holds with equality.
It is interesting to note the similarity between lemma 4 and the lemma 2(1), and when interpreted suitably they have the same intuitive meaning. This indicates that there might exist a close relationship between the Nash and OPT flow-rates and in particular it might be possible to characterize a Nash flow-rate of an instance (G, c, d, R SW ) as an OPT flow-rate for another instance and vice versa. We indeed establish this in the next section by showing an equivalence between Nash and KKT conditions.
However before proceeding further, we first establish a result (proved in the appendix) for an OPT flowrate similar to the result in lemma 3 by considering the KKT conditions coming from the rates.
Equivalence between the KKT and the Nash flow-rate conditions
As intuited via similarities between lemmas 2 , 3 and lemmas 4 , 5, we would like to obtain a characterization for a Nash flow-rate of an instance as an OPT flow-rate possibly for another instance, as well as, the scenarios where Nash is indeed the OPT for the same instance. Clearly, such an equivalence will depend heavily on the kind of cost-splitting mechanisms that are utilized for the edge and the source costs. In the following theorem we consider an edge cost splitting mechanism where roughly the maximum user of an edge pays most of the cost, the source costs are divided equally amongst all the terminals.
Theorem 6
Let z e (x e ) = t∈T x n e,t 1 n , Ψ e,t (x e ) =
x n e,t ( P j∈T x n e,j ) and
The idea behind our proof is the following. Our assumptions guarantee that the optimization problem (NIF-CP) for the instance (G,c, d, R SW ) is strictly convex, which implies that the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that the Nash flow-rate (f, R) satisfies the KKT conditions for the instance (G,c, d, R SW ) for a suitable choice of the dual variables. Such a choice of dual variables is given below. Choosing λ i,t 's: For each i, if there exist a P i ∈ P i,t such that f P i > 0 then take λ i,t := e∈P ic ′ e (z e )z ′ e,t (x e ) else take λ i,t := 0. Choosing µ P 's: For P ∈ P i,t take µ P := e∈Pc
With the above choice of dual variables all the KKT conditions are apparent given equation 4 and the Nash-flow-rate conditions according to the Lemma 2 , except for the complementary slackness condition ν A,t H(X A |X A c ) − i∈A R i,t = 0, which indeed holds as well, as we show below. Clearly, it is enough to show that if (f, R) is a Nash flow-rate, then whenever h i,t − h i−1,t > 0 then
Assume on the contrary that
For a j ∈ {i, i + 1, . . . , N S }, let A j be the minimum cardinality set involving j i.e. j ∈ A j such that l∈A j R l,t = H(X A j |X −A j ). Such a set A j always exists because the Nash flow-rate has the property that N S i=1 R i,t = H(X 1 , . . . , X N S ). We claim that there exists a j ∈ {i, i + 1, . . . , N S } such that A j ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1} is not empty. If this is not true then clearly we have ∪ N S j=i A j = {i, i + 1, . . . , N S } and using the supermodularity property of conditional entropy (ref. Lemma 12 in Appendix E), we obtain N S j=i R i,t = H(X i , X i+1 , . . . , X N S |X i−1 , . . . , X 1 ) which is a contradiction, therefore we must have such a j ∈ {i, i + 1, . . . , N S } such that A j ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1} is not empty. Now let S 1 and S 2 be two sets involving j i.e. j ∈ S 1 ∩ S 2 such that l∈S 1 R l,t = H(X S 1 |X −S 1 ) and l∈S 2 R l,t = H(X S 2 |X −S 2 ), then using the supermodularity property of conditional entropy we can show that rate inequality involving S 1 ∩ S 2 is also tight ( Lemma 12 in Appendix E) i.e. l∈S 1 ∩S 2 R l,t = H(X S 1 ∩S 2 |X − (S 1 ∩S 2 ) ) . This implies that A j , being of minimum cardinality, is the intersection of all sets involving j on which the rate inequality is tight. As we have A j ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1} = φ, there is a l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1} such that l participates in all rate inequalities involving j which are tight.
This implies that we can take out a small amount of rate and flow from j and put it on l without violating the feasibility conditions. Now, since (f, R) is a Nash flow-rate, using approaches similar to that in the proof of Lemma 3 we shall obtain h j,t ≤ h l,t . But this implies in turn that h i,t ≤ h j,t ≤ h l,t ≤ h i−1,t which is a contradiction.
Therefore at the Nash flow-rate (f, R) for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) we have shown the existence of valid assignments to the KKT conditions for the instance (G,c, d, R SW ). Under unique optimum (e.g. convexity) conditions this also implies that the Nash flow-rate is the true optimum.
Corollary 7
for all e ∈ E, where a e 's are positive constants, then a Nash flow-rate (f, R) for (G, c, d, R SW ) is also an OPT flow-rate.
Now we prove a slightly more general result (ref. appendix E) than the Theorem 6 wherein we consider more general cost splitting mechanisms. This generalized result will be of further interest when we abstract the network coding scenario to more general setting of Network Information Flow problems in section 7.
Theorem 8
Let z e (x e ) = (w e (x e )) A , where w e is a homogeneous polynomial of degree m in variables x e,t 1 , x e,t 2 , . . . , x e,t N T and A be a positive real number. Also let Ψ e 's be the edge cost splitting functions, and Φ i 's be the source cost splitting functions, then a Nash flow-rate
while assuming that Φ i 's and y i 's are such that t∈T
can indeed be expressed as a function of y i . In the above, we have denoted
It is instructive to note from the proof of Theorem 8 that the choice of function z e uniquely determines the edge cost splitting function Ψ e as Ψ e,t (x e ) = whereas we have more flexibility with the choice of source splitting functions and in fact we will consider an interesting and reasonable source splitting function other than 1/N T , when we discuss the Price of Anarchy(POA) in the next section.
However, before proceeding to study POA, we would like to point out one important issue that we have not explicitly dealt with yet, that is the existence of a Nash flow-rate for a given instance. First, it is clear that due to the convexity of cost functions, an OPT flow-rate always exist for an instance, however, unlike in the case of selfish routing [14, 13] or single-source multicast [3] , we can not claim the existence of a Nash flow-rate using Theorem 6. Nevertheless, it seems possible to use a similar approach as in the proof of Theorem 6 to establish this claim. Since the feasible region is the same for the social optimization problem or for the individual optimization problem of a terminal, the KKT conditions for these two optimization problems differ only via the cost terms, and it seems possible to choose appropriate dual variables to satisfy the terminals' KKT conditions by using corresponding assignments from the social KKT conditions.
Price of Anarchy
Having established a characterization of a Nash flow-rate as an OPT flow-rate possibly for another instance, we would now like to quantify the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of the terminals. The measure of performance degradation due to such loss in regulation that we adopt is the Price of Anarchy(POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the socially optimum cost [9, 11, 14, 13] . Thus for our model, if (f, R) and (f * , R * ) are the Nash flow-rate and the OPT flow-rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) respectively then the POA for the instance
Now, as we mentioned earlier, Bhadra et al. [3] showed that in the case of single source, when all the edge cost functions c e 's are any monomial functions then the POA is one, where in the edge cost splitting mechanism Ψ e 's used in their paper is essentially the same as that in Theorem 6. However, from Theorems 6, 8 we can note that for most reasonable cost splitting mechanisms, the POA will not necessarily equal one for all monomial edge cost functions. We construct explicit examples for POA not equal one in the Figures  1 and 2 . The example in Figure 1 is near optimal as will be evident from an upper bound on POA derived in Theorem 9 in the following.
First, it is interesting to note that in the case when sources are not correlated, with the viewpoint of Nash or OPT the rates requested at various sources will be fixed and equal their respective lower bounds (i.e. the entropy of that source). Therefore, in this case the cost term corresponding to the sources is determined already, and it remains only to find flows that minimize just the cost term corresponding to the edges. To this end, it is not hard to see that the POA will again be equal to one for all monomial edge cost functions. Therefore, it is the correlation among the sources that is responsible for bringing more anarchy.
Note that while constructing examples in Figures 1 and 2 , the source cost splitting function we have used is Φ s,t (ρ s ) = 1/N T . Further, for the same mechanism, Corollary 7 provides an example of edge cost functions that gives a POA of one, and possibly this is the only choice giving POA one. Before considering another reasonable splitting mechanism, we first establish an upper bound (proved in appendix) which is nearly attainable as per Figure 1 .
Theorem 9
Let z e (x e ) = t∈T x n e,t 1 n , Ψ e,t (x e ) = 
Now let us consider another interesting splitting mechanism Φ s 's where the source costs are not divided equally amongst all the terminals, and they looks more like the edge cost splitting functions Ψ e 's. Specifically, take y s (ρ s ) = t∈T (R s,t ) n 1 n and Φ i,t (ρ s ) = (R i,t ) n P j∈T (R j,t ) n . Further, in general take z e (x e ) = (w e (x e ))
A , which uniquely determines the edge cost splitting function Ψ e as Ψ e,t (x e ) = respectively. If there exists a constant α such that k and l are integers then these are the choice of monomial cost functions leading to POA equal to 1. For instance, if z e , y s , Φ s 's be such that n = 1 and Am = 1, then k = 1 and l = 1 i.e. linear cost functions give POA equal to 1. However, as discussed in Section 2, in the network coding scenario y s is the maximum function and therefore approximated as y s (ρ s ) = t∈T (R s,t ) n 1 n with n → ∞. Thus, there is no monomial source cost function leading to a POA one, irrespective of what monomials the edge cost functions are.
Future Directions
In this paper, we have initiated a study of the inefficiency brought forth by the lack of regulation in the multicast of multiple correlated sources. We have established the foundations of the framework by providing the first set of technical results that characterize the equilibrium among terminals, when they act selfishly trying to minimize their individual costs without any regard to social welfare, and its relation to the socially optimal solution. As common to papers that initiate a new direction of study, this paper leaves out several important open problems that deserve theoretical investigation and analysis.
Network Information Flow Games-From Slepian-Wolf to Polymatroids:
It is interesting to note that all the results in this paper naturally extends to a large class of network information flow problems where the entropy is replaced by any rank function (ref. Chapter 10 in [7] ) and equivalently conditional entropy is replaced by any supermodular function. This is because the only special property of conditional entropy used in our analysis is its supermodularity. Polytopes described by such rank functions are called polymatroids 2 and the SW polytope is an example. Therefore, by abstracting the network coding scenario to this more general setting, we can obtain a nice class of succinct multi-player games, which we call Network Information Flow Games. It would be interesting to study these games further and investigate the emergence of practical and meaningful scenarios beyond network coding. Furthermore, the network coding scenario where the terminals do not necessarily want to reconstruct all the sources should also be interesting to analyze.
Dynamics of Nash Flow-Rate:
Can we design a noncooperative decentralized algorithm that steers flows and rates in way that converges to a Nash flow-rate? What about such an algorithm which runs in polynomial time? A first approach could be to consider an algorithm where each terminal greedily allocates rates and flows by calculating marginal costs at each step. The following theorem (proved in appendix), which might also be of independent interest, provides some intuition on why such a greedy approach might work, as per the relationship between Nash and OPT according to Theorem 6. 
Better bounds on POA: Although we have provided explicit examples where correlation brings more anarchy, as well as, an upper bound on POA which is nearly achievable, we believe that more detailed analysis is necessary. An important approach in this direction would be to characterize exactly how the POA depends on structure of SW region i.e. to analyze the finer details on how correlation among sources changes POA, even in the case of two sources. Further, other interesting splitting mechanisms should also be studied.
Capacity Constraints and Approximate Nash flow-rates:
One immediate direction of investigation could be to consider the scenario where there is a capacity constraint on each edge i.e. the maximum amount of flow that can be sent through that edge. Another interesting problem is to investigate the sensitivity of the implicit assumption in our analysis that terminals can evaluate various quantities, and in particular the marginal costs, with arbitrary precision. This can be achieved by formulating a notion of approximate Nash flow-rate, where terminals can distinguish quantities only when they differ significantly.
Figure 1: All sources are identical with entropy H and d s (y) = C 1 y 2 for all s ∈ S. Also, y s (ρ s ) = max t∈T R s,t which is approximated as t∈T R n s,t 1 n as n → ∞. All edge cost functions are c e (x) = x except for the edge (u, v) for which c e (x) = C 2 x. All other parameters are the same as in Theorem 6. With this, under the condition that
, using marginal cost arguments we can show that the flow-rate where each terminal requests positive rate only from the source 1 i.e. equal to H, and uses only the dashed edges, form the Nash equilibrium. Further, when
, the flow-rate where none of the dashed edges are used, all the data is sent through edge (u, v) and each terminal requesting a rate H N S from each source, achieves lower cost than the Nash flow-rate. This implies that the POA is greater than one. In particular, P OA >
. This is near optimal as evident from Theorem 9.
Figure 2: Both sources are identical with entropy 1 and d s (y) = y for all s ∈ S. All edge cost functions are c e (x) = x except for the edge (1, t 2 ) for which c e (x) = x 2 . All other parameters are the same as in Theorem 6. Intuitively, in the selfish setting the terminal t 2 would prefer the source 1 as the marginal cost of the path from that source would tend to be smaller, however the OPT would like to split the rates between the two sources, and the POA would be greater than one. In the case when y s (ρ s ) = R s,t 1 + R s,t 2 , we can explicitly calculate the Nash cost and the OPT cost which turns out to be 4 and 
A Supermodularity of Conditional Entropy
We shall prove that entropy is a rank function. One of the conditions is its submodularity. This is equivalent to the supermodularity of conditional entropy. Consider the set of N random variables {X 1 , . . . , X N }. Let A be a subset of {1, . . . , N } and let H(X A ) denote the joint entropy of the random variables X i such that i ∈ A. We have 1. H(X φ ) = 0 i.e. the entropy of the empty set is zero.
If
since entropy is always positive.
3. Next we shall show that
To see this, assume otherwise. i.e. H(X A ) + H(X B ) ≤ H(X A∩B ) + H(X A∪B ). Now, we have
which is a contradiction since we know that conditioning reduces entropy. Therefore we have shown that H(X A ) + H(X B ) ≤ H(X A∩B ) + H(X A∪B ) for all subsets A and B, which verifies that entropy is submodular. Essentially the same argument shows that conditional entropy is supermodular.
B Some Properties of Slepian-Wolf Polytope Theorem 11 Consider a vector
, for all S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and
Then there exists another vector
Proof. We claim that there exists a R j * ∈ {R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n } such that all inequalities in which R j * participates are loose. The proof of this claim follows.
Suppose that the above claim is not true. Then for all R i where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, there exists at least one subset S i ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that,
i.e. each R i participates in at least one inequality that is tight.
Consider the subsets S 1 and S 2 , i.e. the subsets for which the inequalities are tight for R 1 and R 2 respectively. We have by assumption,
where in the second step we have used the supermodularity property of conditional entropy. Now we are also given that
Therefore we can conclude that
Now let S 12 = S 1 ∪ S 2 . We have two cases a) S 12 = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
In this case we have a contradiction since the conclusion above implies
In this case consider applying a similar argument as before with S 12 and S 3 . i.e.
Now since
we obtain
If S 1 ∪S 2 ∪S 3 = {1, 2, . . . , n} we have the required contradiction otherwise we can we can argue recursively to arrive at the contradiction. Note that the process terminates since S 1 ∪ S 2 · · · ∪ S n = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The above argument shows that there exists some j * such that all inequalities in which R j * participates are loose. Therefore we can reduce R j * to a new value R red j * until one of the inequalities in which it participates is tight. If the sum-rate constraint is met with equality then we can set R ′ j * = R red j * otherwise we can recursively apply the theorem to arrive at a new vector that is component-wise smaller that the original vector (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ).
C Characterizing Nash Flow-Rates Proof of Lemma 2: (1)
Let us definef t as follows by moving an amount λ ∈ (0, f P 1 ] flow from P 1 to P 2 : for (G, c, d, R SW ) , therefore by the definition of Nash flow-rate
Now, as the marginal cost functions C P 's are continuous (lim λ→0 C P (f ) = C P (f )), the result follows.
(2)
From feasibility condition, we have P ∈Ps,t f P ≥ R s,t ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S. Suppose P ∈Ps,t f P = w + R s,t , w > 0 for some s, t, then we can decrease the flow on a path P 1 ∈ P s,t , f P 1 > 0, by an amount δ ∈ (0, min{w, f P 1 }] with (δ 0) , without violating the feasibility condition. Now since all the cost functions are positive and monotonically increasing, we have
Here f −P 1 denotes the vector of flows except the flow on path P 1 . Therefore,
This contradicts the fact that (f, R) is a Nash flow-rate, thus we must have P ∈Ps,t f P = R s,t ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S.
(3)
As R is feasible, ∀t ∈ T , R t ∈ R SW and therefore, s∈S R s,t ≥ H(X S ). Suppose s∈S R s,t > H(X S ) for some t ∈ T , then from Theorem 11 there exist an s ∈ S, such that all (Slepian-Wolf) inequalities in which R s,t participates are loose. Therefore, we can decrease this rate R s,t by a positive amount r i.e. tõ R s,t = R s,t − r, without violating feasibility. Now since all the cost functions are positive and monotonically increasing, we have
where vector R −s,t denotes the rate vector for terminal t without the rate at source s.
This contradicts the fact that (f, R) is a Nash flow-rate, thus we must have s∈S R s,t = H(X S ) for all t ∈ T .
Proof of Lemma 3:
Let us choose a positive r smaller than f P i and
and define a flow-rate (f ,R) as follows:
( for small enough r, the error in approximation goes to 0 as r → 0)
As (f, R) is a Nash flow-rate,
By continuity of functions C P , as r → 0, C P (f ) → C P (f ) and therefore we must have
D Characterizing OPT Flow-Rates
Proof of Lemma 5: We begin by showing the simple claim that in the SW region one cannot set both the rates to the lower bounds and still remain in the SW region. To see this note that by using the supermodularity property of conditional entropy we get
which shows that we cannot set R 1,t = H(X 1 |X 2 ) and R 2,t = H(X 2 |X 1 ). Therefore it is clear that either ν * {1},t = 0 or ν * {2},t = 0 or both equal 0. Suppose that ν * {2},t = 0. In this case we have
As the cost functions are positive and monotonically increasing, the first term in both the above equations will be positive. Moreover, λ * 1,t and λ * 2,t are non-negative by definition. This implies that we need ν * {1,2},t to be positive which implies that the sum rate constraint shall be met with equality. Now, we have the following conditions. Consider two paths P 1 ∈ P 1,t and P 2 ∈ P 2,t such that f P 1 > 0 and f P 2 > 0. Suppose that the rate allocation for terminal t ∈ T , (R 1,t , R 2,t ) satisfies
Note that in the above derivation while assigning the dual variables λ * 1,t and λ * 2,t we have followed our discussion in section 4 for obtaining the Lemma 4.
E Equivalence between Nash and OPT flow-rates
then we have
Proof:
where in the second step we have used the supermodularity property of conditional entropy (ref. Section A). Now we are also given that
Therefore we can conclude that l∈S 1 ∪S 2 R l,t ≤ H(X S 1 ∪S 2 |X −(S 1 ∪S 2 ) ) and l∈S 1 ∩S 2 R l,t ≤ H(X S 1 ∩S 2 |X −(S 1 ∩S 2 ) ) and consequently that l∈S 1 ∪S 2 R l,t = H(X S 1 ∪S 2 |X −(S 1 ∪S 2 ) ) and l∈S 1 ∩S 2 R l,t = H(X S 1 ∩S 2 |X −(S 1 ∩S 2 ) ).
Lemma 13
Let w be a homogeneous polynomial of degree m in the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n then n j=1 x j ∂w(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∂x j = m w(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ).
Proof:
Since w is a homogeneous polynomial of degree m in the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , each term in the polynomial is of the form B Π n i=1 x m i i where m i ≥ 0, n i=1 m i = m, and B is a constant. Therefore,
which clearly implies that n j=1
x j ∂w(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∂x j = m w(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ).
Lemma 14
Let z = w A , where w is a homogeneous polynomial of degree m in the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n and A is a positive constant, then n j=1
x j ∂z(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∂x j = A m z(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ).
Proof:
n j=1
x j ∂z(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∂x j = 
Let us renumber the sources such that 0 < h 1,t < h 2,t < . . . h N S ,t then the following choice of dual variables ν A,t 's solves the Equation 8. and using the chain rule of entropy, we obtain
H(X i |X i−1 , . . . , X 1 ) = H(X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k ).
